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Abstract—Several research projects have shown that Byzantine
fault tolerance (BFT) is practical today in terms of performance.
Deficiencies in other aspects might still be an obstacle to a
more wide-spread deployment in real-world applications. One
of these aspects is an over-all security architecture beyond the
low-level protocol. This paper proposes the security architecture
SecureSMART, which provides dynamic key distribution, internal
and external integrity and confidentiality measures, as well as
mechanisms for availability and access control. For this purpose,
it implements security mechanism among clients, nodes and an
external trust center.
Index Terms—BFT, BFT-SMART, SecureSMART, Group
Communication
I. INTRODUCTION
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) has become more and
more practical over the last years. Besides lot of theoretical
BFT research, many research prototypes have made important
contributions. But still, there are only a few complete ready-
to-use prototypes, with UpRight [1] and BFT-SMART [2]
being the most predominant examples. Practical use of these
prototypes in production systems is not common at all.
Clement et al. [3] have criticized the focus of lot of
research systems such as Q/U, HQ and Zyzzyva on optimizing
performance in special best-case situations. The authors have
shown that in common fault situations these systems easily
degrade seriously. They propose a different design of a BFT
replication protocol that guarantees good performance even if
there are faulty servers or clients.
Amir et al. [4] describe how timing attacks influence BFT
systems. They have extended the two existing criteria liveness
and safety for another criterion performance-oriented correct-
ness. They built a new replication protocol that meets this new
criterion and handles timing attacks.
Veronese et al. [5] describe EBAWA, a BFT algorithm that
reduces the communication overhead by using the trusted
platform module (TPM) for decreasing the amount of com-
munication steps and replicas. This paper also shows a way to
avoid timing attacks of malicious primary nodes by rotating
them.
All above-mentioned works show good directions for future
BFT developments beyond the optimization for special best-
case situations. However, current ready-to-use implementa-
tions such as UpRight and BFT-SMART do not make use of
these results.
In addition, these implementations do not have an elaborate
security architecture for protecting confidentiality, integrity
and availability. For example, instead of secure mechanisms
for dynamic key management, participant keys typically are
defined statically in configuration files. More advanced mech-
anisms for access control and Denial of Service (DoS) protec-
tion are desirable. In previous work, Amir et al. [6] designed
Secure Spread, which has an elaborate security concept that
shows how to build an architecture that provides these security
mechanism in group communication systems. But it is not
aimed for BFT systems.
In ongoing research work, we aim at making a contribution
to this aspect of BFT replication. The basis we use for our
work is BFT-SMART, an open source Java library that provides
BFT state machine replication [2]. The focus of BFT-SMART
is plainness and robustness. There are also mechanisms that
provide authenticity and integrity protection by using pre-
shared keys. So we are designing and implementing SecureS-
MART, a security concept for BFT-SMART that extends the
library by advanced security mechanisms.
II. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
Figure 1 shows the basic design of our security extension
SecureSMART. This architecture meets the following goals:
• Dynamic key distribution: Whenever a new node
wants to join the BFT system it can apply a certifi-
cate signing request (CSR) at a registration authority
(RA)/certification authority (CA). After receiving the
signed certificate the new node can propose its public
key to all other nodes. After that a new group key needs
to be created, encrypted and proposed to all nodes. In
addition, new group keys also need to be created if a
node leaves the BFT system.
• Integrity and confidentiality of internal communica-
tion: The internal communication system of BFT-SMART
should use the asymmetric key pair to sign and verify
every proposed message. The shared group key should
be used to encrypt every proposed message which is
confidential.
• Integrity and confidentiality of external communi-
cation: The communication system between the clients
and the nodes should also be protected. Therefor we
can use Transport Layer Security (TLS) for client-server
communication.
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Fig. 1. SecureSMART architecture
• Availability: BFT ensures availability by redundancy,
tolerating the failure of a limited number of f nodes. But
if an adversary can attack the availability of the low-level
communication layer at many or all nodes, the whole
system will fail. This means that the BFT system needs
elaborate protection mechanisms against DoS attacks.
• Access control: There should be a mechanism to blacklist
suspicious nodes and clients. One way to do this is a
certificate revocation list (CRL). This implies that there is
an own certification authority that distributes CRLs to the
nodes. This mechanism also influences the availability.
We have to address several challenges in order to achieve these
goals:
• The dynamic group management brings up some prob-
lems: Which nodes may join the BFT system? Is a
valid certificate enough for this purpose? How can access
control policies be distributed?
Another question is how to distribute the public keys?
Only the leader node can propose messages including
the public key and guarantee that the distributed public
key will be distributed correctly even in the presence of
Byzantine faults.
What happens if a node is removed or replaced? The
public key of that node is no longer valid for validating
messages. This potentially has a big impact on internal
validation procedures within a BFT algorithm.
• We are using symmetric and asymmetric encryption
methods in this security concept which brings the fol-
lowing questions:
What are appropriate encryption algorithms? Should the
symmetric encryption use block cipher algorithms or
stream cipher algorithms? If using a block cipher algo-
rithm, what kind of padding and which mode of operation
should be used?
• In a BFT scenario each node should receive the same
information. Based on this fact, it is advisable to imple-
ment group keys for the message encryption. But from
this point there raises the question of how the group keys
should be generated. Does it make sense if all the nodes
together generate the key using Diffie-Hellman (DH)? Is
there an advantage by using Tree-based Group Diffie-
Hellman (TGDH)? Or is it better if the primary node
generates the key?
• In the case that the group key has leaked there have to
be some preventions: How important is perfect forward
secrecy (PFS [7]) in this context? When should a new
key be established?
• Measures to improve the protection against DoS attacks
are Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) SYN-Cookies
and blacklisting of packets source IP addresses. But there
might be some problems with the prevention of TCP
SYN-Flooding attacks by using SYN-Cookies:
At first SYN-Cookies are based deeply in the operating
system kernel. Is it possible to enable this option or
similar options from the view of the Java Virtual Machine
(JVM)?
Another problem of using SYN-Cookies might be a
performance issue.
• The RA/CA is a single point of failure. What does this
mean in the context of BFT? How can we use BFT
replication for the RA/CA?
III. CONCLUSION
In terms of performance, BFT systems have already reached
a level that makes them well-suited for real-world applications.
There are still deficits in other areas that stop BFT from
happening in practice. This work addresses parts of these
problems in the area of security mechanisms. In this abstract,
we have described the basic architecture of SecureSMART, a
security extension for the BFT-SMART library we are currently
working on, and we have explained some of the challenges we
are handling in this architecture.
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